The Realpolitik of the PKK at an Impasse

A Marxist Critique and Review of the PKK and its Sub-currents in Theory and Praxis

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Introduction

As I have indicated in previous articles on various topics, I will henceforth strive to avoid scattered writing and fragmented arguments, focusing instead on coherently critiquing and analyzing political currents and theoretical issues. However, beyond my preferred approach, certain events compel any serious and active political actor to address them, and I am no exception. I hope this material and method can be effective and well-received by workers and toilers (the working class).

Discussing the PKK is immensely difficult because this current is a postmodern **Querfront** party. It encompasses everything from left to right, socialist to fascist, mystic to radical Muslim, atheist to Salafist, Alevi, Sunni, Twelver Shiite, nationalist, internationalist, feminist, and anti-feminist, covering a vast array of ideologies and diverse subgroups. Regardless of any criticisms rightly or wrongly directed at it, and regardless of the readers' proximity to or distance from this party, the PKK is one of the strongest and most influential forces in the arena of *realpolitik*, not just in Turkey but in the Middle East. This characteristic is such that any attempt by imperialist forces and regional states to intervene in the political equations of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran cannot be conceived without considering the role of this movement and the populist, "all-inclusive" organizations affiliated with it. Although any claim by this current to be an organization opposing imperialist *realpolitik* is unrealistic, its presence as a fluid and undeniable force and current in international dynamics makes its examination and analysis important. It is precisely for this reason that the author will address it in this text.

The PKK, even at the height of its armed struggle, is a party that functions in line with complementing imperialist *realpolitik*. It bears a strong resemblance to Germany's Left Party (Die Linke¹), which is one of its closest allies in Europe. Since I have previously critiqued the Left Party in another article, I will refrain from repeating that here.

The only difference between Germany's Left Party and the PKK is that while a part of the German Left Party has accepted postmodernism, it has not declared outright hostility to Marxist theory and still presents itself as following the Marxist and working-class tradition. The PKK, however, has entirely abandoned any positive approach towards Marxism in its totality and has become a completely postmodern anti-Marxist party. To clarify the issues mentioned, in this text, in addition to rewriting and revisiting older material, I will address the latest issues and recent policies of the PKK and currents close to it.

Note: "Querfront" roughly refers to political currents mixing or bridging far-left/socialist and far-right/nationalist positions.

¹To read this article, please refer to the link below. (the article is in Persian)

https://t.me/Communismfornow/2465

The Roots of PKK's Formation: The Kurdish Question and Beşikçi

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), from its formation until now, has consistently been the focus of attention for parties, organizations, currents, thinkers, governments, and political parties of both left and right, within and outside Kurdistan, due to the existence of a real, unresolved issue known as the Kurdish question. One of the Turkish intellectuals supporting the Kurdish people, İsmail Beşikçi—who spent years in the prisons of the Turkish fascist regime for his support of the Kurdish people's liberation—called Kurdistan an "international colony" and believed that the Palestinian and Kurdish issues, as two unresolved issues and two colonies, are closely linked. Beşikçi correctly points to the hypocrisy of Turkish fascists who shed crocodile tears for the Palestinian issue while completely denying the existence of the Kurdish people in Turkey².

Regardless of whether a force from outside the Middle East conquered Kurdistan or not, what is clear is that the policy of oppressive and fascist regional states—including the Turkish regime, the fascist regime of the Islamic Republic, and the fascist Baathist regimes of Iraq and Syria—towards the Kurdish people has been based on denying their national identity, stripping them of human identity [dehumanization], mass killings, military attacks, and policies aimed at turning Kurdish people into subordinate humans and establishing national supremacy in favor of the dominant nation. In relation to this issue of identity stripping, the nationalism of the subordinate nation naturally manifests itself in the first stage as an instinctive reaction and a kind of psychological protective shield. However, when serious individuals and political activists, oppressed classes, workers, and other downtrodden people encounter serious problems and dilemmas in the practical and theoretical struggle with the nationalism—as an inverted consciousness and immediate reaction—comes into existence, and the issue of hegemony and leadership in national liberation movements becomes a reality.

In its early years until the mid-1990s, the PKK always emphasized the formation of a greater Kurdistan. When this party was formed, it was established as a Marxist party supporting the Soviet Union with a "Marxist-Leninist" ideology in the Stalinist sense, and for many years it was engaged in imaginary planning from Turkish Kurdistan ("Bakur") to Ganaveh [Iran]. Over time, the PKK consigned the issue of greater Kurdistan to oblivion, and the concept of democratic confederalism³—a kind of romantic attempt to return to the pre-"modernity" era—replaced the "greater Kurdistan⁴" in the party's literature. The acceptance of democratic confederalism by the PKK and its promotion was, in fact, abandoning pseudosocialist Stalinist ideas and an attempt to be accepted within the framework of the prevailing *realpolitik* in Turkey.

² İsmail Beşikçi, *Kurdistan: internationale Kolonie*, 1. Aufl, Internationale sozialistische Publikationen (Frankfurt am Main: ISP-Verl, 1991), vgl.

³ Abdullah Öcalan, *Demokratischer Konföderalismus* (Köln: Internationale Initiative "Freiheit für Abdullah Öcalan - Frieden in Kurdistan", 2012), vgl.

⁴ Aliza Marcus, *Blood and belief: the PKK and the Kurdish fight for independence* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), vgl.

Exactly like many European left parties that abandoned pseudo-socialist ideas after the collapse of "actually existing socialism," the PKK also replaced its Stalinism with an amalgam of postmodern illusion and dream. This acceptance is nothing but adapting itself to imperialist policies and an attempt to "come to one's senses" and accept bourgeois-imperialist rationality, just as the shift of parties and forces known as communist and former supporters of the Soviet Union towards "Eurocommunism," social democracy, Keynesianism, the New Deal, "animal rights," and environmental protection within the framework of bourgeois logic has been nothing but adaptation to the status quo.

Aliza Marcus, a journalist specializing in Kurdish issues, traces the real roots of the PKK's formation to the years 1949 to 1976, a period when Kurdish identity once again became dominant in Turkey. Öcalan, during his time in Ankara, became familiar with Marxist student movements and entered circles that eventually led to the formation of the PKK⁵ in 1978. After the PKK was formed on November 28, 1978, in the village of Fis near Diyarbakir, it moved the organization outside Turkey in 1980 following the military coup and began armed struggle⁶ against the Turkish state in 1984. With the start of the armed struggle against fascist political oppression in Turkey, Turkish Kurdistan became a center for political struggles and solidarity with this current. The fascist Turkish government, by declaring martial law, exiling people from Kurdish regions, and carrying out bloody suppressions, tried to control this massive movement that had started by resorting to various methods (refer to the critique of Öcalan's world/worldview).

When the PKK was formed, it focused on principles such as supporting the effort for the formation of an independent, united, and democratic Kurdistan, the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, and raised the slogan of "Independent Proletarian Internationalism" [based on prior user clarification of ambiguity]. It announced its existence⁷ with the slogan "Long live PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)."

The Kurdish issue is one of the unresolved problems of the Middle East, and apparently, as long as bourgeois and authoritarian fascist, Bonapartist, and local dictatorial regimes exist in this region, this issue will not be resolved. The Kurdish issue, however, with the formation of capitalism in this region, especially after the Sykes-Picot Agreement⁸ and subsequently the Treaty of Lausanne, has become a major issue in regional conflicts. Kurdish nationalists pretend that there was a Kurdish government that was divided into four parts with the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

⁵Marcus, 28ff - ⁶Marcus, vgl. 46ff - ⁷Marcus, 46. ⁸The Sykes-Picot treaty (or agreement), named after an Englishman Mark Sykes and a Frenchman François-Georges Picot—acting as representatives of the French - British governments—took shape in 1916. It concerned the division of regions separated from the Ottoman Empire between the imperialist French government and British imperialism. As a result of this agreement, the French took control of Lebanon and Syria, while the British controlled Palestine, and Iraq largely fell under British influence and mandate. The Sykes-Picot agreement was so savage and colonial that these two colonialist politicians, taking up a ruler, divided the lands and peoples in an arbitrary, mosaic-like fashion [lit: divided humans mosaically], without paying the slightest attention to the human and cultural realities [lit: issues] of the peoples in those regions. It was as a result of this agreement that the Kurds formerly under the dominion of the Ottoman Empire were divided into three parts.

The "Treaty of Sèvres⁹," concluded near Paris after the end of the imperialist war known as World War I, condemned the Ottoman Empire as the loser alongside Germany to pay reparations. However, due to the resistance of fascist and nationalist Turks—the same Turks who massacred one and a half million Armenians—it never came to fruition. One of the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres was the recognition of Armenia as an independent country. Armenia was occupied by Tsarist Russia in 1916. Immediately after the glorious 1917 revolution, in 1918, the Soviet government recognized the right of nations to self-determination. Armenia, despite its close proximity to the Soviet Union, was recognized as an independent republic.

Following this, the Treaty of Lausanne was held in 1923, a treaty that can almost be said to be an obvious betrayal by imperialist powers against the Kurds, and its implementation is the main obstacle to the formation of a Kurdish nation-state to this day. This, of course, is a false dream and wish that Kurdish nationalism clings to in search of constructing its own history and forming imagined communities. There is no doubt that after the Sykes-Picot Agreement in May 1916 (a secret meeting to divide Arab regions under Ottoman control) and after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the ground was practically prepared for the division of Kurdish regions under the influence of the Ottoman Empire.

According to İsmail Beşikçi, the pro-Kurdish writer in the book "Kurdistan: An International Colony," through the imperialist policy of divide and rule, they [the Kurds] were practically betrayed. This led them to feel they had been betrayed by imperialist powers, and the utopia of forming a Kurdish state and turning Kurdistan into a modern nation-state like others remained unrealized¹⁰. Beşikçi correctly says that if the Treaty of Lausanne meant the formation of a Turkish nation-state for the Turks, for the Kurds, it meant depriving them of their identity [identity erasure], dehumanization, denying their identity, forcing them to forget the Kurdish language, and identifying themselves as Turks.

Although Beşikçi's book title might be misleading and interpreted by some supporters of postcolonial studies to mean that Kurdistan was colonized from the outside, based on such logic, he [according to this text's interpretation] denies Kurdistan being a colony or even a semi-colony. He points to the fact that, on the contrary, a racist identity erasure was imposed on them by Turks who, before the formation of the Turkish nation-state, were under the rule of the Ottoman Empire alongside the Kurds. This reality fundamentally separates the Kurdish issue from the Palestinian issue despite their similarities. In Palestine, a force from outside the region imposed itself through the force of arms and systematic violence; in Turkish Kurdistan, a force from within Turkish society imposed itself (ibid).

As Stefan Ihrig correctly emphasizes, Atatürk was a full-fledged fascist and the spiritual father of Hitler and the German Nazis¹¹. The formation of the Turkish nation-state and the rise of modern Turkey resulted from the systematic denial of other oppressed nationalities in this country, extensive killings of Kurdish, Greek, Bulgarian national minorities, and in continuation of one of the largest genocides of the past century, namely the Armenian genocide by Ottoman sultans.

⁹ Miriam Gassner, Der Vertrag von Sèvres: Vertragstext und Analyse des Friedensschlusses mit der Türkei vom 10. August 1920 im Kontext der Pariser Vorortverträge (Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2023), vgl.
¹⁰ Beşikçi, Kurdistan, vgl. 26ff.

¹¹Stefan Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination (Cambridge (Mass.): The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014).

Therefore, contrary to the propaganda of fascists and nationalists who present Atatürk as a representative of modernity in Turkey and a figure fighting Islamic reaction, etc., it must be pointed out that Atatürk represents a fascism that reaches its peak in Hitlerian National Socialism. If Atatürk had not faced technical and logistical limitations, he might have committed genocide to the same extent as the Nazis.

The beginning of the PKK's political activity involved emphasizing the unification of all four parts of Kurdistan and forming a nation-state. However, it wasn't long before this conformist party changed its positions. By proposing the "democratic confederalism" project, it abandoned the idea of a greater Kurdistan and the formation of a Kurdish nation-state. By accepting postmodernism without discarding nationalist thoughts, it entered another phase of political activity¹². Öcalan himself openly declares that his ideas on democratic confederalism are influenced by Murray Bookchin's ideas and his communalist works on ecology¹³.

PKK as a Petty-Bourgeois Nationalist and Postmodern Yet Authoritarian Current

The class origin and political view of the PKK, like other Kurdish parties, is non-working class. Although the PKK in the early days of its formation (late seventies to early eighties) always emphasized its Marxist-Leninist nature, apparently with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world, the PKK, like many European Stalinist parties, retreated from camp socialism. It chose pseudo-left postmodernism and a kind of "progressive" neoliberalism as its ideology¹⁴. And the ultimate goal of this organization, like other bourgeois organizations and parties, changed to reaching a bourgeois society—a society that manifested itself in the form of the "Rojava Social Contract" and the bourgeois praxis prevailing in this region. I have previously written many times in critique of the PKK and critique of the program and non-revolutionary praxis of this current despite its militant appearance, and I see no need to repeat them again. What I am trying to point out in this text is the fundamental difference between the goals of the PKK and similar currents and the goals of revolutionary communists.

If the goal of communists is to end oppression and tyranny, servitude, class, national, and racial oppression, and liberation from social reproduction labor, neither the PKK nor any Kurdish or non-Kurdish nationalist party and political organization have ever wanted to eliminate all forms of oppression and servitude. Their goal is to share political power, create and provide a bourgeois society based on exploitation and nationalism, and impose national and gender oppression on other nations and the workers of their own nation.

Therefore, communist unlike chauvinists and fascists, expansionists, advocates of social homogenization, assimilation policy, and dehumanization, as well as national oppression and national/racial discrimination, see these issues and seek true and real solutions that radically eliminate any oppression of human by human.

¹²Ergun Aydinoglu, Die kurdische Bewegung in der Türkei, übers. von Klaus E. Lehmann, Deutsche Erstausgabe Dezember 2020. Überarbeitete, erweiterte und aktualisierte Ausgabe (Karlsruhe, Baden: Neuer ISP vgl., 2020), vgl. 9/131ff.

¹³Aydinoglu, vgl. 146ff.

¹⁴Refer to the book Critique of Öcalan's World

Among these oppressions, and perhaps one can boldly say one of the most important, is the national and racist oppression imposed by dominant and authoritarian nationalism and bourgeois nation-states on oppressed peoples and stateless nations or colonized peoples. The communist current, as has been observed many times throughout history, does not seek to resolve the national question by stripping oppressed nations of their identity in the manner of fascists, authoritarians, nationalists, centralists, and chauvinists such as Atatürk, Hitler, Reza Khan, Khomeini, and Saddam and their other cronies like Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad, Erdoğan, and Netanyahu. Rather, as Marx states in the introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right concerning the critique of religion and religious oppression, socialists and communists are not looking for imaginary remedies for real pains. Instead, they want to identify and eradicate all real pains.

The ultimate solution to national oppression is to end nationalism throughout the world, nationalism, and expansionism by ending exploitation and oppression at all levels and through the implementation of socialism and ultimately communism. Because only in a classless society will all diversities become a normal phenomenon, and with the destruction of class society, humans will be freed from any other oppression. Class and aristocratic, racist, and sexist thoughts will gradually become obsolete, because in a society where classes have been abolished and all humans have moved from the position of object to subject, there should no longer be a reason for humiliation and oppression of others. The effects of past misanthropic ideologies will gradually join history, on the one hand by ending the roots of their reproduction and on the other hand through continuous enlightenment and education.

The PKK has never sought a socialist and communist society, and for this reason, it does not seek to resolve the Kurdish national issue through ending exploitation and colonization. It is not without reason that this hybrid [lit: camel-cow-leopard] organization, in different periods, depending on the prevailing situation and polarizations that form in the world between states over imperialist *realpolitik*, takes the side of one of the powers instead of advancing a revolutionary *realpolitik*¹⁶.

The situation of the PKK as a petty-bourgeois current that occasionally signals left but turns right is no different from the situation of Makhnovists and Mensheviks—petty-bourgeois social democrats who accused Lenin and the Bolsheviks of narrow-mindedness on various issues, but who themselves are at best populists (of the *narodnik* type) and petty-bourgeois populists who sought a "democratic" bourgeoisie within the framework of imperialist *realpolitik*¹⁷.

The organizational structure of the PKK, according to most who have written about this party, including Aliza Marcus, emphasizes that this party has never had a democratic structure based on democratic centralism or direct democracy and consensus. The PKK is a leader-centered party and in terms of party concept, it resembles fascist parties more than leftist parties. It is not without reason that the words of "Leader" Apo are more decisive than any democratic decision in the party.

¹⁵ Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, Marx-Engels-Werke 1 (Berlin/DDR: Dietz, 1976), vgl. 378ff.

¹⁶ Hassan Maarfi Poor, (2023, ماركسيسم و رئال پوليتيك انقلابي (هانوفر: كتابخانه ي گرايش ماركسي, vgl., https://hassan-maarfipour.com/2024/05/16/3802/.

¹⁷ https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1919/military/ch49.htm

Another interesting point is that some PKK "dervishes" [dismissive term for supporters] always declare that the PKK has never had a relationship with Iran. Aliza Marcus writes that between 1986 and 1987, Öcalan assigned his younger brother, Osman Öcalan (who was later undemocratically thrown out of the party and had to seek refuge with Barzani), to contact Tehran. Some PKK forces were stationed around Urmia and Maku and likely in other places in western Iran¹⁸.

Regarding the elimination of oppression against women: contrary to the propaganda presented in the media and liberal-left and nationalist-left outlets about the position of women, the PKK neither in theory nor in praxis seeks to fundamentally solve women's oppression, just as this organization has never sought to fundamentally solve the oppression of workers and other oppressed people. Since the PKK does not examine the real roots of women's oppression, it has not sought, and does not seek, a radical solution through the abolition of bourgeois production relations in its area of influence in northern Syria. Instead, it has continued capitalist production relations in the same old ways.

Despite changes in the position of women in Rojava and northern and eastern Syria due to women's entry into military organizations, women have not been able to free themselves from wage slavery, poverty, oppression, and second-class status. On the other hand, the Rojava Social Contract, published a few years ago and translated into various languages, is a completely bourgeois contract that guarantees private ownership of the means of production and the interests of capitalists and landowners, and is in line with the exploitation of workers and the oppression in society.

In diplomatic and military-political dimensions, the leadership of the PKK and forces close to it have always sought a kind of bourgeois *realpolitik* and diplomacy within the framework of capitalism. The proximity of Rojava's leaders to the fallen Assad regime throughout their years of rule in Syria, or Mazlum Kobani's message of condolence for the death [orig: سقط شدن - falling/perishing, used contemptuously] of the president of the Islamic fascist regime of Iran, Ibrahim Raisi—one of the fascist executioners of the 1988 massacre disaster who died [orig: سقط شد] in a helicopter accident on his cooperation with the newly empowered fascist regime in Syria, which is an officially fascist and Islamist regime, and signing agreements and treaties with this regime, while the ruling regime led by the "new Khomeini," Ahmad Sharaa, is slaughtering Alawite people, shows how much the petty-bourgeois project ruling in Rojava moves in line with imperialist *realpolitik* and how it aligns with the policies that the Turkish fascist regime has adopted to end the PKK.

The PKK, as the mother of all these parties, political organizations, and colorful formations, has always proceeded with the strategy of compromise-war, war-compromise. One instance is the peace treaties between the PKK and the Turkish fascist regime between 2013 and 2015²⁰.

¹⁸ Marcus, *Blood and belief*, vgl. 133ff.

¹⁹ https://kurdane.com/?p=73833

²⁰ Aydinoglu, *Die kurdische Bewegung in der Türkei*, 131ff.

If the Turkish regime gives the PKK the opportunity to function as a parliamentarian party within the framework of an authoritarian and fascist capitalism like the current Turkish regime, undoubtedly the PKK would accept this without the slightest problem. It would become part of the state and police repressive apparatus of the authoritarian and fascist bourgeoisie in Turkey against the Kurdish and Turkish working class, just as the forces under Mazlum Kobani, theoretically close to the PKK, became part of the Syrian fascist regime²¹.

After Osman Öcalan resigned from the PKK over internal organizational issues, apparently in protest against the PKK's emphasis on armed struggle, he took refuge in Erbil and became subservient to [lit: defeated by] the Barzani tribe. Apparently, although Osman Öcalan was ideologically close to the Barzani line—staunch enemies of the PKK, a force that is like a thorn in their side—some of the issues he raised regarding internal eliminations and the PKK's brutal methods for suppressing internal opponents, for enforcing the prohibition of any sexual relationship, and group executions on false pretexts, are undeniable.

The Position of Öcalan's Works and Views

If the conditions of the Middle East have forced the left and communist elements of society to practically defend Kobani and the cantons of Syrian Kurdistan against the alternative of neoliberal barbarism and Daeshism, there is no reason for communists to throw Marxist works into the dustbin of history and accept the Sufi-like outpourings of Abdullah Öcalan's mind, known as Leader Apo, as socialist theory and an alternative to the bourgeoisie. Some of Öcalan's discussions and works should be read, although there is no coherence in his works and they are full of highly contradictory statements. Although Apo has little to say in terms of writing form and content, and his discussions can hardly be called theoretical even reluctantly, studying Öcalan's works is necessary to better understand the views of a **Querfront** current like the PKK and to reach a better understanding of this all-inclusive mixture and populist [khalqi] current. Studying all of Öcalan's writings, which according to his supporters amount to 120 works, has been difficult for me, especially due to their lack of clarity and coherence, so I limited myself to studying his later works and views.

Personally, I do not see a shred of progressiveness not only in Öcalan and the PKK but in any kind of anarchism. As Lenin said, sometimes conditions force us to cooperate with opportunists who have disguised themselves as Marxists, but if this cooperation is long-term, it means the defeat of the left and communists by opportunistic reaction.

Öcalan is far more backward than utopian socialists. Although he claims to have formed a new theory by drawing on various theories from Nietzsche to Foucault, André Gunder Frank, and Bookchin, his theories are actually an amalgam of conspiracy theory, nationalism, fundamentalism, and also mysticism. Öcalan is actually theoretically closer to the new European right movement, as a **Querfront**. KCK, PKK, PYD, PJAK, and KODAR—various types of currents affiliated with the PKK—are steps behind the populist left of Iran in political, theoretical, cultural, and relational terms.

²¹ https://t.me/engelabrojava/72882

The populist left of Iran and the world, as anti-colonial currents during the era of national liberation movements in countries such as Cuba and Vietnam, and as a result of being influenced by a specific political culture, were formed wanting to oppose imperialist *realpolitik* by adopting armed and revolutionary methods to liberate the masses dependent on colonial countries from the clutches of oppressors and colonizers. A large part of this left, due to not having a Marxist political horizon, was ultimately defeated by the national bourgeoisie of oppressed nations. Those who did not surrender were arrested, tortured, and executed by the bourgeois quasi-fascist regimes of countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, and other regions where the authoritarian national bourgeoisie of colonial and semi-colonial states came to power. This left, in fact, never had a Marxist and working-class communist origin, and a large part of this left looked at politics from the perspective of the subaltern bourgeoisie. Some of these leftists, although they repeated Marxist literature in a slogan-like manner, were actually moving in the ranks of the national bourgeoisie and the nationalism of oppressed nations and therefore had no fundamental connection to Marxism.

Supporters of the PKK and Öcalan declare that Öcalan has gone beyond Marx, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Foucault in addressing the issue of power and other issues²². The reality is that this is an exaggerated and false claim. Öcalan has not gone beyond Marx and Hegel at all, just as Hardt and Negri and other delusional postmodernists did not go beyond Marx and Engels, although these postmodernists have repeatedly made such baseless claims. The theories of Abdullah Öcalan as the spiritual and charismatic leader of the PKK, contrary to what the authors of the "Critique of Öcalan's World" claim, are not idealistic even in the common usage of the term. Öcalan's theories are more based on a halo of postmodernist illusions and past-oriented spiritualism, and even quasi-fascist and petty-bourgeois [sentiments], which is more a kind of postmodern Sufi-like spiritualism than materialistic or idealistic. This not only does not go beyond Marx, but it is not even a return to pre-Marxist pseudo-scientific theories. For example, Joseph Proudhon's petty-bourgeois socialism, which sought to solve property by turning non-owners into owners and replacing money with coupons, is steps ahead of Öcalan's reactionary and fundamentalist theories. This is while Marx, in the book "The Poverty of Philosophy," very precisely criticized Proudhon from the perspective of the critique of political economy and Marxism and went beyond Proudhon's quasi-anarchist utopian socialism²³.

This petty-bourgeois nationalism, if yesterday it manifested in Ukraine in the form of anarchism and stood against the Soviet government, today in Kurdistan, in the form of an opportunist organization advocating *realpolitik* that on one hand claims to follow Murray Bookchin's theories on confederalism and has turned from "socialism" to advocating anarchism, has become an anti-communist current—a current that declares communism finished along with "real" socialism. This current, despite claiming to be internationalist and supporting women's rights, etc., and despite its supporters believing that Öcalan's theories in the field of "jineology" go beyond feminism, the truth is that what Öcalan expresses about women is based on sexism, nationalist illusions, and backward misogyny. Declaring that "jineology" is a "new science²⁴" is as incorrect as Althusser trying to de-Hegelianize Marxism by calling Marx's views a "new science²⁵."

²² https://anfpersian.com/%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86/antshar-yk-ktab-drbarh-chkydh-athar-bdallh-awjalan-69593

²³ Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, *Marx-Engels-Werke 4* (Berlin: Dietz, 1972), vgl. 63ff.

²⁴ https://naghd.com/2021/01/25/%d9%81%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d8%b2-

[%]d9%81%d9%85%db%8c%d9%86%db%8c%d8%b3%d9%85%d8%9f/#respond

²⁵ Louis Althusser, *Für Marx*, hg. von Hans Blumendberg u. a., übers. von Karin Brachmann und Sprigath (Frankfurt (Main): Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), vgl.

Öcalan's praise and admiration of the Prophet of Islam for advancing polygamy in favor of men, under the name of the Prophet's love for women and God, is truly insane and intolerable. Interestingly, in the book "Manifesto of Women's Freedom," Öcalan presents the Prophet of Islam's multiple relationships with different women and the enslavement of women in wars as serving women's freedom!

Anarchism or the Desire for a Return to Barbarism

In fact, the views of the PKK and Öcalan represent a reactionary and counter-revolutionary regression from communism and scientific socialism. Öcalan's thoughts—as romantic, Sufi-like, postmodern thoughts that seek a return to the past instead of seeking happiness in the future—are theoretically dozens of steps behind the scientific socialism of Marx and Engels. The worst kind of utopian socialism is far more progressive than the theories of Öcalan and the PKK.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of communist and working-class organizations in the Middle East, currents such as the PKK have become a beacon of socialist light in public opinion. But the theories that the PKK has used from the past until now to analyze society and feed to the deluded masses are nothing more than an amalgam of illusion and reality—an amalgam that is nationalist, populist, Stalinist, anarchist, social democratic, religion-seeking, and in a word, postmodernist.

Postmodernism in the West is a combination of idealism and spiritualism, materialism and religion, superstition and atheism, nationalism and anti-nationalism. In fact, postmodernism is neither idealistic nor materialistic, and for this reason, all kinds of religious and non-religious theories are combined by postmodernists and at best lead society toward destruction and collapse. A postmodernist can simultaneously be a socialist and a devout [lit: two-fire] Muslim! The situation of Öcalan and his party is far worse than Western postmodernism. Öcalan claims to be an anarchist on one hand, while on the other hand, he represents a highly nationalist, fundamentalist, and feudal rhetoric. He claims to have gone beyond Marx, Hegel, and others, and simultaneously compromises with the Turkish fascist regime. He is an internationalist, nationalist, Sufi-minded, left-right quasi-fascist, and fundamentalist neoliberal postmodern Querfront.

The PKK has been highly unstable and has never lost hope in the fascist Islamic parliament of Turkey; this hope continues. In fact, the PKK, like any other bourgeois and petty-bourgeois party, has its feet in the streets of Diyarbakir, its hand on the trigger of a Kalashnikov in Qandil, and its head next to fascist Erdoğan in the Turkish parliament. This multiple condition has created a situation where any policy and agreement adopted by the PKK that keeps it close to Erdoğan's fascist government is not unexpected.

Those who want to present the PKK as an alternative to the bourgeoisie and the status quo—all their struggles and views are in line with *realpolitik*. These individuals and currents either do not have the ability to organize a revolutionary and socialist current, or under the name of socialism and communism, they have been defeated by Kurdish postmodern populist opportunism, namely the PKK, and have opportunistically risen to weaken scientific socialism and communism. I must point out that communists strongly condemn any aggression and attempt to ban and declare the PKK and similar currents as terrorist by imperialist and regional governments and stand against it while simultaneously defending revolutionary and socialist hegemony in resistance movements and national liberation movements. This conditional defense of the PKK will not prevent us from criticizing postmodernist thoughts of the PKK and similar

populist [khalqi] currents from a socialist perspective. On the contrary, these issues make the necessity of criticism much greater.

The PKK and all parties and currents affiliated with it have for years been drooling [lit: water hanging from lips and snout] for peace with the ruling executioners in Turkey, including peace with Erdoğan, who emphasizes two ideologies of political Islam and Pan-Turkism. When Erdoğan raised the issue of teaching Kurdish in schools and through this, for a specific period, transformed the PKK from an opposition in Qandil with a wide social base among the people of Kurdistan into an ineffective and pacifist position, there were many people like Şivan Perwer—who for years sang anthems for the PKK and guerrillas—who prostrated themselves [lit: clung pleadingly] at Erdoğan's feet and praised him. Şivan Perwer is not just one person; Şivan Perwer represents factions of the PKK that for years beat the drum of war-compromise, compromise-war, and with every insidious promise of Turkish rulers, fell to bone-licking for Turkish fascism.

The issue of national liberation of the Kurdish people in different parts of Kurdistan, especially in Turkish Kurdistan, is a sweet dream that the PKK has used for years to buy credibility for itself. When it failed in Turkish Kurdistan and in the opportunistic peace project in Turkey, it took its forces to Syrian Kurdistan and tried to establish a position and base for itself there and implement the primitive "stateless" Öcalanian or Apoist state—which is actually nothing but medieval serfdom—under the name of "anarchism." Interestingly, YPG and YPJ forces have so far shown special respect for the region's tribes, who have a lot of power and influence due to their reliance on land and money and never approach them from a critical angle. It can be said that the PKK is a *realpolitik* party and nothing more.

Omid Behrang, in an article criticizing Abdullah Öcalan's "Manifesto of Women's Freedom," correctly shows that Öcalan on one hand elevates woman to the level of God and on the other hand lowers her again to the level of a prostitute.

"Because Sumerian civilization was separated from its roots, it was led astray. Today's civilization prevailed over Neolithic civilization. The priest-king phenomenon took shape, temples were created as the main womb of the new society. Priests cunningly forced society into obedience to them and woman into obedience to man. Priests selected girls for the temples and trained them to play the most effective role as tools in hunting the men of society. The first wicked conspiracy is thus arranged, and for the first time in the temples, extraordinary power is given to the vile system between the two sexes. This system later turns the temple into the first public brothel." (Manifesto of Women's Freedom, p. 30) "The first Kurds in the Sumerian slave system were degraded using the female sex and made accomplices [of the slave system] ... The free Kurd of the primitive communal society is brought down from the mountains in a short time via these temple girls and accustomed to the city." (ibid, p. 102) "Traitors are degraded through the female sex in the city." (ibid, p. 103) (Excerpted from Omid Behrang's article)

While the YPG in Syrian Kurdistan are in many practical respects more "progressive" than all the ruling states in the Middle East, this is clear. But one should not forget that the intellectual founder of this system is none other than Öcalan, and the Middle East is a swamp of different fascist ideologies and systems. Öcalan on one hand dreams of returning to the pre-modern era, in other words, medieval relations and small manufactory production, and on the other hand emphasizes strongly racist, sexist, and anti-woman concepts. That woman is the mother of the nation, etc., shows Öcalan's reactionary and medieval viewpoint.

Öcalan can be introduced as the representative of Kurdish postmodernism and contemporary sophism in the Middle East. Of course, one should not forget that the theoretical and practical issues in Syrian Kurdistan are different. Öcalan's theories are intensely reactionary and feudal, but the praxis of the ruling forces in the region under YPG/YPJ influence has been partly progressive, at least in recent years. A crucial issue to consider is PKK's opportunism due to its petty-bourgeois position and ideology. The PKK is supported day and night in Europe by leftists and anti-fascists, but the PKK shows no solidarity with the struggles of other oppressed nations. Incidentally, forces close to the PKK, at least in past decades, feel closer to an occupying regime like Israel. In Öcalan's works and materials published by the PKK, we witness strong tendencies of chauvinism, nationalism, conspiracy theory, and romanticism.

The emphasis on the democratic nature of the Kurdish "nation" and "civilization" actually shows how nonsensical Öcalan's definitions of these concepts are. Democracy, as discussed from the time of Plato and Aristotle to today, is a form of rule and has no relation to nationality or ethnicity. Insisting that Kurds have always been democratic is, if not stupidity, fascist. Another issue is that civilization, unlike culture, refers to the immediate aspects of human life that humans foster through logic and reason. Lukács, in the article "Old Culture and New Culture," points out that the external and internal beauty of a building is a cultural matter, but its heating, cooling, and structural rigidity belong to civilization. If civilization is an immediate phenomenon, as I, like Lukács, believe, while culture is a mediated phenomenon or a form of second nature, then talking about democratic civilization is truly, if not stupidity, fascist²⁶.

The PKK is a party lacking any theoretical foundation and recruits members solely through emotions, sentiments, coercion, and putting others in positions of obligation. As I said, the praxis of this organization in Rojava does not stem from the progressiveness of its theories but is due to a necessity imposed upon the PKK. Komala, too, in the years after the 1979 revolution in Iranian Kurdistan, was Maoist, but in practice, it acted far more progressively than what was on paper. Komala's first congress was actually a severely backward congress irrelevant to any socialist progressiveness.

The PKK wants to gradually erase the image presented of it as a "terrorist" and nationalist force and transform into a party that has "come to its senses," raised the issue of political power in the Middle East and plays a role in the ongoing *realpolitik* game. The PKK seeks recognition as a "democratic" current by international terrorist states (NATO members), imperialist and regional terrorist states, the UN, the European Parliament, and other "human rights" institutions, and removal from the "terrorist" list. That's why in Rojava it talks about a democratic system and democracy from below and implements it to some extent.

Hearing these issues is annoying for European leftists and socialists because they always have access to second-hand mainstream information and lack first-hand knowledge of the conflicts and polarizations in the Middle East. Those who defended Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge—who brought a criminal and anti-human system to power in Cambodia under the name of a communist system and sent millions to their deaths in the most barbaric way possible—now also defend the PKK.

²⁶ Georg Lukács, Über die Vernunft in der Kultur (Leipzig: Reclam, 1985), vgl. 194f.

Committed and revolutionary communists and Marxists—not liberal, self-proclaimed communist opportunist leftists—must defend the national liberation of minorities subjected to national oppression and suppression, whose identity as citizens and humans is denied. Their defense of these minorities should not be conditional on approving their leadership. The point is that we communists must recognize the right of oppressed minorities to liberate and support and defend it. If a nationalist opposition like the PKK is at the head of the national liberation movement of the Kurdish people in Syrian and Turkish Kurdistan, that is no reason for us to completely question the masses' struggle for liberation from the claws of ruling fascism and stand alongside fascists like the former Assad regime, the current regime of Ahmad Sharaa, the fascist Islamic regime in Iran, or the fascist and Bonapartist Erdoğan regime. If in Palestine the only organized opposition force against the apartheid Israeli regime is Hamas, there is no justified reason for us, due to the lack of revolutionary leadership and opposition to Hamas, not to support the national liberation of the Palestinian people and instead defend Netanyahu and the fascist Israeli regime.

Communists, however, unlike social democrats, do not believe in gradual, reformist liberation step-by-step. For example, one cannot act like reactionary social democratic parties and currents such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan [referring to specific factions] and other currents that declared, "We first seek national liberation, and postpone revolution and socialism to the period after achieving national liberation." Although these parties now not only don't mention socialism or social democracy but howl alongside neocons for US military intervention and Zionist fascist regime [intervention] in Iran and are ready to lick the boots of invading Israeli soldiers who have raped tens and hundreds of women and children in the Gaza Strip, bombed hospitals, and slaughtered innocent and defenseless people en masse.

National liberation is subordinate to general liberation. If we equate national liberation with political liberation, in my view, within the capitalist system means the liberation of capitalists and landowners, generally the bourgeoisie, and not the liberation of the proletariat and all working people, then the cause of national liberation is tied to a revolutionary and socialist emancipatory horizon. Defenders of national liberation, instead of concentrating their forces behind the bourgeoisie of oppressed nations, must seize political power themselves. As observed in the overwhelming majority of so-called national liberation movements from Poland to Ireland, India, Algeria, Congo, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, and many other places, the liberation of the bourgeoisie not only did not lead to the liberation of workers and the oppressed but sometimes the national bourgeoisie of oppressed nations perpetrated such suppression and savagery against the workers of their own nations that it was sometimes more savage than the savagery of Western colonizers. Saying these truths should under no circumstances mean justifying the savagery and barbarism of racist colonizers and occupiers. The point is that the national bourgeoisie and non-national bourgeoisie aim to advance their class objectives and defend the class hegemony of their own class, and in terms of habits and traditions, see themselves closer to the colonizing bourgeoisie than to the workers and toilers.

It is not without reason that in the majority of national liberation movements, wherever the national bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation became hegemonic, instead of advancing revolution and all-out war against colonizers and imperialists, they entered through the angle of compromise, bootlicking, and selling out the interests of workers and toilers to the colonizing bourgeoisie. An extreme and prominent example of this selling out of proletarian interests and complicity in the genocide of the Congolese people exists. The national bourgeoisie of Congo collaborated with the colonizers in the genocide of revolutionary and popular fighters who wanted an end to colonialism. Gandhi, presented as a hero by the imperialist

bourgeoisie, easily turned his back on the militant and revolutionary working class and engaged in bootlicking for the British colonizers against the communists and the Communist Party²⁷. Nelson Mandela, celebrated to this day as a hero of the bourgeoisie and the fight against apartheid, sold out the communist leaders of the African National Congress to the colonizers. After the communists were executed and slaughtered, Mandela was made into a harmless anti-communist bootlicker hero of the imperialist bourgeoisie. During Mandela's rule, on August 16, 2012, Mandela's "anti-apartheid" regime attacked striking miners at the Marikana mine with arms and slaughtered 34 workers in broad daylight²⁸.

As the history of national liberation movements and the socialist movement shows, it is not the bourgeoisie that will solve the national question. Rather, it is the socialist movements that, by strengthening workers' internationalism and unity among workers of oppressed nations against the national bourgeoisie, local bourgeoisie, and global bourgeoisie, stand tall. By forming a system based on abolishing private ownership of the means of production, collectivizing production, ending the exploitation of humans by humans and nations by each other, and recognizing the right of nations to independence or non-independence, they will radically solve the national question. After the October Revolution, the national question was solved by recognizing the right of nations to independence.

The Armenian people, subjected to genocide on a million scale by the Ottoman Empire, gained the right under the Soviet government to be part of the Soviet Republics as an independent republic voluntarily, while preserving their national independence. Finland, which was a center of socialist revolt and revolution, took the path of complete separation from the Soviet government due to the dominance of the ruling social democratic line in that country. In the process of Finland's independence, not a single bullet was fired by the Soviet Republic towards the newly established country of Finland. This shows how radical and humane the socialist solution to the national question is, whereas the bourgeois solution entails exploitation and colonization, military campaigns, genocide, and denial of the national identity of oppressed peoples²⁹.

²⁷ Aijaz Ahmad, *Klassen Nationen Literaturen: eine theoretische Betrachtung*, übers. von Ina Batzke, Erste Auflage (Kassel: Mangroven Verlag, 2022), vgl.

²⁸ https://zeitschrift-luxemburg.de/artikel/nach-marikana-das-massaker-an-suedafrikanischen-bergarbeitern-und-die-arbeiterfeindliche-politik-des-anc/

²⁹ https://www.nzz.ch/international/der-rote-pate-an-finnlands-wiege-ld.1321421

From Liberal Left Illusions about the PKK to Bourgeois Rule in "Rojava" and North and East Syria

In the "Social Contract³⁰" of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, one can clearly see traces of anarchist ideas (left liberalism or social democracy). This contract, however, is a step forward compared to all the laws of the bourgeois states in the region and even the world. [But] it's a contract that in practice has not been implemented at all and cannot be. Cultural obstacles and problems, strategic and tactical issues in the region, the danger of successive foreign attacks, and the resistance of tribes against dispossession have practically made the implementation of this contract's clauses impossible.

Since Syrian Kurdistan's society has historically been systematically and fascistically repressed, the ground for the formation of a conscious working class armed with class consciousness and Marxist theory has not objectively formed there. The PKK—as an intensely populist, melancholic, **Querfront**³¹ force wavering between left and right, petty-bourgeois quasi-fascist and anarchist ideology—has been the only available opposition to the people of this region and has managed to impose itself as the alternative. This social contract is heavily influenced by the eclectic thoughts of Öcalan, the PKK leader in prison. The most fundamental problems of this "Social Contract" are that it looks at solving social inequality not from the standpoint of a critique of bourgeois political economy but from the bashful standpoint of quasi-anarchist social democracy. Since this entire program remains at the level of generality and does not examine issues concretely, it opens the door for various exploitations [interpretations/manipulations].

I present the intensely contradictory clauses of this contract below and try to state their irrelevance to socialism and collective ownership of the means of production.

• Article 6 (Oath):

- o "I swear by Almighty God and the blood of the martyrs to remain loyal to this social contract and its provisions, to protect the democratic rights of the people and the values of the martyrs, to guard the freedom, health, and security of the regions of the 'Democratic Federation of Northern Syria,' to preserve a united Syria, and to strive for the realization of social justice based on the principles of the democratic nation."
- Critique of Article 6: As you can see, superstitious and reactionary religious ideology dominates this article. Swearing by "Almighty God" and the "blood of martyrs," even if it were a tactical matter (which it is not) to appease the masses, is intensely reactionary and superstitious. Any progressive force speaking of human freedom and liberation cannot believe in reactionary religious ideology and the sanctification of the fallen.

³⁰ https://problematica-archive.com/social-contract/

o If we compare this clause with the clauses of the Paris Commune or the early Soviet Union after the October Revolution and compare the policy of the ruling forces in Rojava with the Commune and the Soviet Union during Lenin's era, we will realize that the Commune and October were thousands of steps more progressive than the **Querfront** forces in Rojava. In the Paris Commune, the role of religion in politics was completely eliminated, and religion became a purely private matter. After the October Revolution, although religious minorities enjoyed equal rights with all citizens, the Bolsheviks did not cease propagandizing against religion and religious reaction for even a second. The ruling forces in Syrian Kurdistan, instead of socialism and human liberation, still consider "Almighty God" and the "blood of martyrs" as factors of their legitimacy. Reaction permeates this clause.

• Article 11 (Economic Principles):

- o "The 'Democratic Federation of Northern Syria' is based on the principles of collective ownership of land, water, and energy; is based on eco-industry and social economy; does not permit exploitation, monopoly, and the objectification of women; and realizes health insurance and social security for all individuals."
- Critique of Article 11: Here it must be stated: if collective ownership of land exists, then why have the tribal leaders and landowners not been dispossessed? Why should there be an exception in this regard? Is not dispossessing landowners, tribes, and Khans of the region allowing them to reproduce pre-capitalist modes of production, namely the feudal mode of production? The problem is that the ruling forces' understanding of exploitation there is intensely bourgeois and moral, not Marxist. Exploitation is not used in its Marxist sense. When they speak of not allowing the exploitation of women, they mostly mean sexual exploitation, not women as labor forces who receive wages in exchange for selling their labor power, where their wages are not equal to the work performed. It must be explained here what this eco-industry is and how the social economy functions. Such generalities without precise explanation of these concepts are extremely dangerous. One progressive part of this clause is ending the objectification of women.

• Article 17 (Human Rights):

- o "The 'Democratic Federation of Northern Syria' adheres to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all human rights charters."
- O Critique of Article 17: Article 17 is mostly an article for diplomatic flirting with Western bourgeois states—the main perpetrators of international terrorism, global exploitation, proxy wars, and destroyers of the environment—and is intensely populist. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a completely bourgeois declaration written from the perspective of the bourgeoisie's interests, a declaration that holds private ownership of the means of production sacred. If the ruling forces adhere to all clauses of this declaration and human rights charters, then please let them stop presenting themselves as a left force and alternative and stop creating illusions among the people that a different form of production relations prevails in northern Syria. I have previously critiqued the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and see no need to repeat those discussions here.

• Article 43 (Private Property):

- o "The right to private property is guaranteed as long as it does not conflict with the public interest. The law specifies how."
- Critique of Article 43: In this clause, one can discern the fundamental contradiction of the Querfront ideology of the ruling forces in Rojava and northern Syria and their bourgeois understanding of private ownership of the means of production. This article of the program is even more backward than the articles in the Gotha Program (the program of the German Social Democratic Party, which Marx sharply criticized). Firstly, the ruling forces there do not differentiate between private property and private ownership of the means of production. Private (personal) property is not private ownership of the means of production, and these two must be separated. Secondly, if their interpretation of private property is indeed private ownership of the means of production (I suspect it is), then private ownership of the means of production is in conflict with the public interest. Because those in society deprived of private ownership of the means of production are automatically deprived of equal rights in accessing social facilities and welfare and must work as workers and modern slaves for the owners of the means of production. Therefore, the ruling forces there must resolve this contradiction themselves. Either they follow bourgeois laws and bourgeois political economy based on the exploitation of labor power and extraction from workers, or if they consider the exploitation of human by human an anti-human and illegal act, they must engage in a critique of bourgeois political economy and implement the abolition of private ownership of the means of production through dispossessing the owners of means of production, capital, and land. If, due to strategic issues, tactics, regional conditions, the possibility of revolt by tribes owning means of production (tribes with thousands of armed forces and millions of dollars in capital), they currently lack the ability to implement this, then resorting to contradictory and bourgeois formulations to keep these forces [on side] is, in my opinion, if not foolish, charlatanism and opportunism.

The rest of the clauses of this program can be found, more or less, in the programs of European social democratic parties, Green parties, and even the constitutions of Western states.

The fundamental critique of this program and its articles must be a critique from the standpoint of the critique of political economy. This program, like all programs of Western bourgeois parties and states, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, etc., is rife with linguistic populism and fundamental contradictions. It tries to provide a more "humane," tolerable, "rational" relationship for people while preserving capitalist relations, without touching the root of the matter and propagating the abolition of private ownership of the means of production and collectivization of production resources. Despite all the criticisms leveled against this program, one can say that overall and compared to the state laws of the terrorist and fascist states in the region, it is more progressive. Perhaps many progressive clauses can be observed alongside reactionary ones in this program. But ultimately, this program remains adrift in the horizon of bourgeois cosmopolitanism and does not lay the path of liberation and movement towards emancipation, socialism, and communism before society. We communists always declare that there is no middle way between socialism and barbarism. No bourgeois state or economy, even in the most "welfare"-oriented countries, can claim to have ended exploitation as long as workers are forced to sell their labor

power to survive, and as long as some parasites accumulate capital for themselves by exploiting the labor power of others.

PJAK as an Islamist, Populist Current with Fascist Methods

The PKK is among the political organizations that have created dozens of subsidiaries and political organizations for different parts of Kurdistan. KODAR is an umbrella under which currents like PJAK (Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan) are subsidiaries, organizing for the PKK in Iranian Kurdistan. PJAK's inflated [balloon-like] growth in Iranian Kurdistan occurred in the absence of the struggle of the communist Peshmerga force (the former Komala of the revolutionary Marxism era) and under conditions where traditional Kurdish nationalist parties were asleep [lit: sleeping in the cow's ear] in their camps in Iraqi Kurdistan. In such a situation, and as a result of the cooperation of Kurdish reformist forces with various factions of the regime in Iranian Kurdistan, under the authority of the PKK, and with the overlooking eye of the IRGC and the Islamic regime of Iran towards its presence, PJAK formed as the Iranian Kurdistan branch of the PKK. PJAK's formation coincided with the expansion of Kurdish publications in Kurdish cities and the fanning of the embers of pro-regime Kurdish nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan during the governmental reform project era. Pro-regime forces, formerly harboring illusions about the KDPI and other Kurdish nationalist organizations—always oscillating between top-down reforms and bottom-up bargaining—supported the PJAK formation project.

Kurdish-Iranian "intellectuals" of dark thought [pessimistic/reactionary], who had lost hope in Kurdish nationalism and traditional Kurdish nationalist currents, drew closer to this discourse with PJAK's formation. A large part of the Kurdish nationalist currents inside Iran, always seeking minor changes—organizations and individuals who on one hand defended a nationalism mixed with racism and fascism, and on the other hand waited day and night for the Protestantization [internal reform/secularization] of the Islamic government and the empowerment of the Kurdish bourgeoisie at the local level under the shadow of Islamic fascism—people who had abandoned the idea of autonomy and advocated regional federalism, had partly lost hope in the KDPI and the nationalist factions split from Komala, gradually moved closer to PJAK and the PKK.

Interestingly, when Öcalan was arrested in 1999 by security agencies linked to Western governments, Turkish MIT, and Mossad, huge demonstrations took place in various cities of Iranian Kurdistan, including Sanandaj and Marivan, and several people were even killed by agents of the Islamic Republic. The PKK current at that time subjected the protesting people of Kurdistan—who turned the protest against Öcalan's arrest into a broad struggle against the fascist Islamic regime—to vile verbal attacks in the style of the Islamic Republic, calling the people who demanded the overthrow of the Islamic Republic and Öcalan's release from the Turkish fascist regime's prison "disruptors" and attacked the people. Apparently, the Islamic Republic's support for the PKK at that time had led the PKK to attack the people instead of attacking the Islamic Republic, which was killing youths in Sanandaj and Marivan (refer to the critique of Öcalan's world/worldview).

Many who supported PJAK's formation—from reformists and nationalists believing in legal struggle within the framework of the Islamic Republic, to militant individuals tired of traditional Kurdish parties—ended up defending an ultra-populist and right-wing current that, in reality, did not need weapons to fight the Islamic Republic. The majority of PJAK supporters understood one thing: the prevalence of nostalgia for armed struggle and the intertwining of the lives of the oppressed masses of Kurdistan with the

Peshmerga force. PJAK exploited precisely this situation. When it observed the retreat of traditional Kurdish nationalist currents into their camps in Iraqi Kurdistan, when it knew that the Kurdish opposition, from the KDPI to all currents known as Komala, operated with the permission of a local authority—one part officially linked to Turkish MIT and the other to the IRGC—it presented the Qandil mountains and guerrilla life as an alternative to camp life, thus having a freer hand in military movements.

While the PKK guerrilla force lived its life in the Qandil mountains, and PJAK presented exactly this lifestyle as the alternative, the camp-dwelling Kurdish currents were engaged in exhausting organizational tasks: caring for cows, goats, sheep, chickens (referring here to parties known as KDPI), moving empty water tankers from one corner of the camp to another, and imposing a tiresome, deadly life on social refugees and escapees known as Peshmerga in these camps. These camps were economically and politically subordinate to the hegemony of Kurdish tribal currents and subsidiaries of Iranian intelligence and Turkish MIT (which identify themselves as the Kurdistan Regional Government).

This camp life was, in reality, beating water in a mortar [pointless effort]. [People] in the camps gradually became alienated from their humanity, and if they found no chance to reach Europe, they either went mad, surrendered to Iran, or ended their lives through suicide. In this situation, the Phalangist, fascist, and terrorist current PJAK was born as a pro-Iran regime current in the lap of the PKK and the Qandil mountains. A current without clear principles, aware of the absence of traditional forces in Iranian Kurdistan as Peshmerga. A current that, years before its formation, was busy publishing Kurdish newspapers and cultivating Kurdish culture and literature within the Iranian regime's state institutions.

This current managed, over time, through phony gunmanship [lit: false musketeering], occasional clashes [lit: bangs and clatter] with Iranian border posts belonging to the police and IRGC, and sometimes the army, to create a false "popularity" for itself. This "popularity" was rooted in the absence of the Komala Peshmerga force, successive splits within Komala, and the efforts of breakaway forces to present themselves as *the* Komala to society, effectively manipulating society. If every year or every few years a Peshmerga force affiliated with the Organization of Toilers, or Gardi Azadi, or even Komala-Organization of Kurdistan of the Communist Party of Iran had a military and partisan presence, they all introduced themselves as the "original Komala," "old," and "genuine."

This opportunism and duplicity towards society, alongside the lack of continuous presence of the communist Peshmerga force and the KDPI sleeping soundly [lit: in the cow's ear], had caused the people of Iranian Kurdistan, influenced by past nostalgia, to incline towards a current that roamed militarily in the region. PJAK (the Iranian branch of the PKK) gained false "popularity" and indeed inflated growth. After a while, PJAK automatically turned into a fascist and hated sect in the eyes of the masses. However, the Rojava developments caused Kurdish nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan to revive, and PJAK again transformed into a political force, not merely a fascist Islamist sect.

Recent developments, including the assassination of Saman Daneshvar by this fascist and criminal sect using medieval methods, and the torture of this former PJAK member whose only crime was abandoning the quasi-fascist ideology of "Öcalanism," along with extortion by PJAK's fascist gunmen in the style of the former KDPI from the people, have further increased the hatred of the working masses, toilers, kolbers [cross-border porters], and rural laborers in the border areas towards this fascist sect. PJAK extorts land and pasture fees from poor villagers who own a few sheep and goats. It seems the ownerless nature of Kurdistan and its pastures have all come under the sacred ownership of this fascist sect. A few

days ago, PJAK killed another person named Ayub Ahmadi in the village of Dari in the Marivan region in a criminal manner.

If the KDPI assassinated Vahid Dousti months ago in the village of Tangisar near Marivan because he was sympathetic to the PKK, a Phalangist organization like PJAK assassinates Saman Daneshvar for leaving PJAK, extorts money from people in border areas, forces villagers with goats and sheep to pay taxes to PJAK, and compels workers in border areas to pay taxes. If this fascist terrorist sect killed military forces of the Islamic Republic, especially the IRGC, nobody in Iranian Kurdistan would have a problem with it. But the problem is that this fascist sect extorts from ordinary people and workers, and if someone refuses to pay taxes, they are murdered by PJAK, like Soran Akhtar.

It should be noted that the murder of Soran Akhtar using intensely anti-human and criminal methods has further fueled the wave of hatred against PJAK. A segment of the people in Iranian Kurdistan are disgusted by these savage actions and the assassination of former PJAK members and have developed hatred for PJAK. The Islamic Republic easily overlooks this issue, apparently due to political deals and arrangements with PJAK and the PKK over regional issues, including Syria. The Islamic Republic does not consider the PKK or PJAK as forces seeking its overthrow or a danger to itself, and for this reason, it holds night sessions and banquets with them and has entrusted the protection of impassable areas and tax collection from kolbers and border workers to PJAK, this dark-thinking terrorist force.

Even if PJAK and the PKK are not directly subordinate to IRGC orders, and even if all hypotheses and theories about close cooperation between PJAK/PKK and the fascist Iranian regime are unreal (which they are not), PJAK is still no different from the IRGC. PJAK can easily be criticized based on its daily positions and praxis, showing it to be a fascist and dangerous current. At a time when people across Iran are disgusted with religion and the ruling fascist regime, PJAK consistently issues statements on religious occasions like Ashura, Tasua, Eid al-Fitr, and Eid al-Adha, honoring these reactionary and religious events. At a time when the fascist Iranian regime has become an absolutely alien regime with characteristics of Bonapartist regimes, like a yoke around society's neck, PJAK and the PKK are busy making deals and meeting with this hated and fascist regime, which massacred five thousand protesters in the November [2019] uprising and issued death sentences for those arrested in that popular movement.

PJAK is the product of specific social conditions in Kurdistan. These conditions, in reality, are nothing but the illusion of reforming the regime from within. The PKK, as PJAK's godmother, itself operated legally for years under the authority of the Islamic Republic in the cities of northern Iranian Kurdistan, organizationally within another organization inside the IRGC—the most terrorist, savage, and fascist political-military force within the Islamic Republic system—and currently, the PKK has had and has no strategic problems with the Islamic Republic. PJAK, of course, is a tool for the PKK to gain concessions from the Islamic Republic. Whenever it feels the Islamic Republic is creating security obstacles for PKK activities, the PKK deploys PJAK guerrillas on the borders of Iranian Kurdistan to show the presence of guerrilla military force in the region, while simultaneously declaring that they have kept the flames of "armed struggle" alive.

PJAK's main emphasis in recent years has not been on armed struggle to overthrow the Islamic Republic, but on expanding Kurdish literature and civil, non-political struggle within the system itself and under the shadow of this government. PJAK tried to change shop names in Iranian Kurdistan and Kurdish areas to Kurdish names, publish Kurdish newspapers and magazines, plant trees in Kurdish areas, etc. All

these things are positive in themselves, but the reactionary and counter-revolutionary horizon of this regressive organization, its nationalist and illusory perspective towards the Islamic Republic, has always taken precedence over tactical and military efforts in border regions. Whether PJAK or the PKK have been involved in betraying activists inside the country to the forces of the Islamic Republic is currently unclear to me. However, rumors in this regard have been spread by former supporters of PJAK and the PKK themselves in Kurdistan. The propaganda these forces have conducted regarding political prisoners supportive of them has, to a large extent, involved giving clues to the Islamic Republic. The criminality of the Islamic Republic regime in executing political opponents should not be overlooked.

The bottom line is this: the overthrow of the regime of ignorance and terror, the Islamic Republic, ultimately passes through the channel of armed struggle. Anyone who denies this is a villain [criminal/reprobate]. Anyone who does not understand this issue and, in the style of reactionary postmodernists, desires a return to barbarism, cannot comprehend that the barbarism and savagery of the Islamic Republic's Islam is not a feudal system, but the modernization of Islam within the framework of fascism.

That left and communist political forces currently lack the ability to take up arms to overthrow the Islamic Republic system is clear. However, any force that declares the era of armed struggle is over and that we should engage in civil activity to persuade the leaders of the Islamic Republic to accept dissidents, for me, has no essential class difference from the bloodthirsty Islamic Republic regime.

We must emphasize this issue more each day: the left and communists of society must ultimately take up arms and answer the oppressors with arms. The monopoly on the use of weapons exists in all so-called democratic systems everywhere on this planet. Disarming the masses and entrusting weapons and tools of repression to the state is an inseparable part of the "nation-state" phenomenon. According to the communist position, violence can only be monopolized by the working class in power.

Those seeking any fundamental change, those seeking eternal liberation from the claws of modern capitalist savagery and barbarism, cannot recommend populist, reformist, postmodernist, post-colonial, etc., solutions. Our issue with the bourgeois machine of repression is not about democratizing this machine but about overthrowing the whip with which the majority of people are suppressed. Therefore, alongside smashing the bourgeois state structure and eliminating the monopoly on repression as a result of armed struggle, we must severely expose and condemn bourgeois pacifism, which these days is fed to the student and non-student masses under the guise of sociological theses by the Giddens, Habermases, etc.

The machine of capitalist repression and savagery is not reformable; this machine must be brought down in a radical revolutionary transformation with the tool of the proletariat's weapon, and any counter-revolutionary resistance must be crushed in a revolutionary manner using weapons. Those who declare armed struggle and revolution violence, in reality, derive a strange pleasure from the whip of bourgeois violence and savagery and assess the persistence of savagery to be in their favor. But our goal is the destruction of this system, this whip, and this slavery.

Regarding PJAK, several issues must be clarified:

- That PJAK in recent years has consistently presented itself as a current defending the environment
 and, through demagogic propaganda, tries to exploit the social potential of masses whose lives are
 endangered by environmental pollution—this claim alone is no reason for the progressiveness of
 this current. A current that kills defenseless and innocent people but considers itself a defender of
 the environment is no different from Hitlerian fascism. Hitler massacred millions but was himself
 a vegetarian.
- 2. The silence of Komala Organization of Kurdistan of the Communist Party of Iran shows that Komala has become a subsidiary of PKK and PJAK policies. Repeated night meetings [convivial gatherings] with PJAK have placed Komala in the camp of the Islamic Republic [Note: This is a strong accusation likely reflecting factional disputes]. Komala, which has always condemned the bombing of border areas of Iraqi Kurdistan and the Turkish fascist army's attacks on border areas of Iraqi Kurdistan under the pretext of PKK forces' presence, must also condemn the criminal assassinations by PJAK, this fascist sect and subsidiary of the PKK.
- 3. The assassination of those who left PJAK, both today and in the past within the mother party (PKK), shows that this Mojahedin-like current [referencing MEK's cult-like characteristics] is a fascist current with barracks principles and has no serious difference from European far-right currents. The subaltern position of Kurdish nationalist and far-right currents like PJAK and the PKK should not be a reason to defend the counter-revolutionary policies of these forces. Fascist terror is different from red and revolutionary terror. A fascist force always kills the weak and unarmed, but a progressive force (communist or anarchist) always surprises state and police centers and, as much as possible, only targets forces in high state positions, not low-ranking soldiers! A distinction must be made between the use of terror as a tactic to frighten the state and terrorism as the strategy of a state force or a fascist sect.
- 4. Any political force that wants to intimidate society and its political opponents and responds to political criticism with guns and terror is a backward reactionary force. PJAK, as a quasi-revolutionary force of the hollow revolutionary type, although claiming revolutionary-ism, stands in practice in the camp of counter-revolution. It defends Shi'ism and has repeatedly called for commemorating Ashura and Tasua. It has never questioned private ownership of the means of production. It has no economic program different from the Islamic Republic and bourgeois systems and follows no policy separate from imperialist *realpolitik*. PJAK, as a right-wing populist party, gives the masses an aesthetic promise of happiness but presents no horizon other than a reactionary one similar to the Islamic Republic. And this is while the overwhelming majority of the masses have moved beyond the discourse of Islamic fascism and Shi'ism; PJAK clings to Islamic ideology and Shi'ism and won't let go of Islam.

Abdullah Öcalan's Historic Message' or: The Historic Surrender of the Postmodern PKK Current to the Fascist Turkish Regime and the Implementation of Imperialist Realpolitik

Abdullah Öcalan, in a "historic" but predictable message—while spending over 25 years in the prisons of the Turkish fascist regime, having been kidnapped in 1999 with direct support from Mossad and the CIA and handed over to the fascist and racist Turkish regime—recently issued a call for PKK guerrilla forces to lay down their arms and dissolve their party. This message was translated into most living languages of the world in a very short time via ChatGPT [Note: This claim about ChatGPT seems unlikely for a message from Öcalan in prison and might be the author's rhetorical flourish or misunderstanding] and published on various internet pages and in bourgeois media.

Currents and governments close to, and sometimes aligned with, the fascist Turkish government welcomed this message, portraying the situation as if, with a message from someone imprisoned for over 25 years, the entire PKK current—a vast social movement encompassing all spectrums, groupings, parties, organizations, and various subsidiaries—would suddenly surrender to Turkey, and the Kurdish issue would be resolved by this message. The PKK, apparently always lagging by several decades, adapts itself to various forms of *realpolitik*. But as a thoroughly populist [*khalqi*] and completely crowd-pleasing postmodern current claiming democratic confederalism, it lags behind many global changes. It joins the camp of Western imperialism and its regional allies (i.e., Israel) precisely when the thugs affiliated with Barzani have already scraped the bottom of the barrel of subservience and imperialist *realpolitik*, leaving nothing for them.

Öcalan's message is issued while the Turkish fascist regime simultaneously attacks positions of forces close to the PKK on several fronts in northern Syria. It comes while Selahattin Demirtaş, leader of the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), remains in prison; the prisons of the Turkish fascist regime are full of Kurdish political prisoners or supporters of the Kurdish people's liberation from Turkish fascism; Turkey has not only not ceased its occupation and state terrorism but becomes more savage and repressive day by day. It comes while thousands of young guerrilla fighters have been massacred in recent years and decades due to Turkish army bombings; the Turkish fascist regime has not cut its support for ISIS and Islamic fascist groups; none of the factions—Islamic fascists, secular Atatürkist Turkish fascism, or pro-West currents in Turkey—have abandoned their racism or recognized Kurds as first-class citizens. It comes while Afrin remains occupied by mercenary forces affiliated with the Turkish fascist regime; the consequences of the extensive Turkish fascist regime's attack on Syrian Kurdistan in 2017 have not yet been erased; and the false promise of peace in 2013 by the Islamist fascist Erdoğan not only failed to materialize but, like this message, turned part of the PKK body into supporters of Erdoğan's Islamic fascism³².

Following Öcalan's message, numerous reactions emerged from governments and political parties inside and outside Europe. Germany's Left Party and some German media outlets supportive of the PKK officially supported this call for surrender and purism [abstentionism?], declaring that the PKK, contrary to the propaganda of the Turkish government and European states including Germany, is not a terrorist party and seeks peace. On the other hand, we witness the acceptance of this call for surrender by the PKK "Leadership Council" in Qandil. A part of the PKK's European structure, operating under the name of Kurdish associations and organizations, gallops [lit: at four-hoof speed] towards defending the call for surrender, seeking to escape exile and turn Turkey into a haunt for annual travel. Interestingly, the German government has declared that even if the PKK lays down its arms and makes peace with the Turkish regime, it is unwilling to remove the party from the terror list. The German government is one of the European

supporters of the Turkish fascist regime and, from the era of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway in 1903 to the present, has been a staunch supporter of the Ottoman Empire and genocidaires like Sultan Abdul Hamid II, Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha, and Atatürk. German Nazis recognized Atatürk as their spiritual father and the father of fascism. As Stefan Ihrig says in the book "Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination," Atatürk's influence on Hitler and German Nazism was even greater than Mussolini's inspiration³³.

The post-fascist German regime after the second imperialist war has maintained very close and extensive economic, political, diplomatic, and security relations with various Turkish governments to this day. This set of relations is one reason why Germany treats PKK defenders, especially Kurds from Turkish Kurdistan who support the PKK, so repressively and brutally.

It is possible that among the quasi-left factions of the PKK, parts may not align with this call for surrender and may genuinely continue their activity and armed struggle under the cover of other organizations and parties. However, what this call demonstrates is, in reality, nothing but the reproduction of imperialist *realpolitik* and the reproduction of all those policies pursued for years by parties like the KDPI, KDP (Iraq), PUK, and the Komala Organization of Iranian Kurdistan (Mohtadi faction). The PKK and its leadership, with this call, showed that it is a petty-bourgeois opportunist party of the Mojahedin type, willing to kiss the hands of the executioners of the people of Turkish Kurdistan for a share in political power. This shows that such a party has never pursued the interests of the workers and oppressed Kurds in Kurdistan.

The content of Öcalan's message, like his postmodern thoughts, is confused, irrational, and counter revolutionary. Öcalan, as a Kurdish leader, once fell in love with Stalin and Stalinism under the influence of the hegemony of actually existing "nasosocialism" [likely a typo in Persian for "national socialism" or just "socialism," used dismissively] prevailing in the Soviet Union. He drew close to a political line under which the Soviet Union, instead of supporting the proletariat, pursued the liberation of the national bourgeoisie and supported the national bourgeoisie of oppressed nations against imperialism. The same line brought the Ba'ath parties of Iraq and Syria to power, supported the Tudeh Party of Iran and the Iraqi Communist Party, supported Khomeini, etc. The difference between the PKK and the Tudeh Party and other Stalinist parties in the eighties was that the PKK joined the political arena within the framework of camp "nasosocialism" late. Furthermore, it joined that assembly when the Soviet Union was traversing the path of collapse and decay. Another difference was that practically any political activity for a Kurdish party or organization in Turkey was impossible without resorting to arms and taking refuge in the mountains or neighboring states as a rear base. The PKK is the product and illegitimate child of the *realpolitik* of the collapsing Soviet Union and camp "nasosocialism." In reality, the PKK arrived late to scrape the bottom of a pot whose food was already finished.

³² Aydinoglu, *Die kurdische Bewegung in der Türkei*, vgl.

³³ Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*, vgl.

The PKK, which for years had chosen the strategy of Kurds coming to power and forming a greater Kurdistan—meaning empowering the Kurdish bourgeoisie against the bourgeoisie of other countries—suddenly abandoned this strategy at the leadership level after Abdullah Öcalan became acquainted with the works of the anarchist thinker Murray Bookchin³⁴ in prison, and emphasized a completely new subject under the name of democratic confederalism. Aliza Marcus, a journalist supportive of the Kurdish issue, in her book "Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence," published in English, discusses—in addition to the main origins of the PKK's formation—the entire history of this party and the different factions of this organization through library and field research, honestly and far from any exaggeration, aggrandizement, or lies. Although Marcus's book reviews the PKK up to 2007, in my opinion, it is one of the best works introducing the multiple Janus faces of modernity under the title PKK³⁵.

In this very call for surrender, Öcalan claims that Turkey has become democratic. Anyone with an iota of sense who examines daily news and events sees this as an empty claim.

In a part of this message, an amalgam is thrown together that leaves one speechless. From Öcalan's words, we read:

"...The PKK emerged in the 20th century, one of the most violent centuries in history, amidst two world wars, the Cold War, the collapse of realistic socialism, and the denial of Kurdish reality, especially prohibitions related to freedoms. Theoretically, programmatically, strategically, and tactically, it was heavily influenced by the reality of the realistic socialist system in the 20th century. The collapse of realistic socialism in the 1990s due to internal reasons, as well as the collapse of identity denial in the country and the progress made in freedom of expression, rendered the PKK meaningless and overly repetitive. Therefore, like its similar examples, its era has ended, and its dissolution has become necessary. Throughout more than a thousand years of history, Turks and Kurds, for survival and confronting hegemonic powers, have always emphasized voluntary unity. Capitalist modernity in the past 200 years has tried to shatter this unity. Forces influenced by this trend, along with their class bases, have served this goal. This trend accelerated with unilateral interpretations of republicanism. Today, reorganizing this historical relationship, which has become severely fragile, in a spirit of brotherhood and without ignoring beliefs, is a fundamental task..." (Excerpted from the Persian translation of Öcalan's message³⁶)

It is unclear what the original text was or who translated it with what intention. But I must confess that in slightly more than twenty years of serious study of Marxism, this is the first time I have encountered the fabricated term "realistic socialism" (سوسياليسم واقعگر ايانه). If Öcalan's intention with realistic socialism is the same as "Real Socialism" or "actually existing socialism," one could say that form of state capitalism based on exploitation, commodity relations, and alienation was hardly realistic! But if his or the Persian translator's intention is "Social Realism," it must be said that is an intellectual school known as "Socialist Realism," which substitutes the state's vulgar Marxism of the Stalin era for Marxism and social reality.

³⁴ Murray Bookchin

³⁵ Marcus, Blood and belief, vgl.

³⁶Link to Öcalan's appeal on the 'Rojava Revolution' Telegram channel. https://t.me/engelabrojava/72632

Another intensely misleading point is that Öcalan equates two separate phenomena: modernity and capitalism! And claims that capitalist modernity destroyed the 200-year "voluntary unity of Kurd and Turk." Firstly, it must be said that modernity takes shape with the Renaissance and rebirth in the era known as the modern age. It refers to the modernization or updating of thought and social/economic relations, and in Kant's terms, to a revolution in thought—emerging from medieval reaction and returning to, and a kind of rebirth of, the ancient phenomenon, i.e., the rebirth of antiquity in another form. Capitalism also refers to a mode of production relations where, simply put, capitalists gain power and dominance over other classes, and in the Marxist sense, refers to a mode of production where commodity relations and the inversion of subject-object relations through humans becoming slaves to commodities and money prevail over other modes of production. Öcalan, however, like schoolchildren who haven't memorized their lessons well, equates these two phenomena to make his shoddy claim about the long-standing friendship of Kurd and Turk seem true, while such a thing has no basis in reality. Ultimately, Öcalan, as a backward and past-oriented postmodernist, seeks the solution for the present in searching for a "good past," which is actually an imaginary and false abstraction.

The history of modernity's formation in Europe takes shape with the Copernican revolution in the era of Copernicus, Galileo, and Giordano Bruno, and manifests itself in a different, more modern sphere in the secularist philosophy of Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. The history of capitalism's formation is also far longer than 200 years. And finally, it must be said that throughout the history of past empires, from the era of Ottoman sultans to the formation of "modern Turkey" by a fascist named Atatürk, national minorities from Kurds and Armenians to Greeks and Bulgarians and other nationalities have been systematically slaughtered. Therefore, these statements by Öcalan are laughable, even as diplomatic pleasantries.

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that this "historic call" is nothing but alignment with the policies of the fascist Turkish state and the PKK leadership aligning with the murderers of the people of Kurdistan. The goal of the fascist Turkish regime is undoubtedly the massacre of the people of Turkish and Syrian Kurdistan in the absence of a comprehensive armed organization. The Turkish state will certainly not achieve what it seeks, and for this reason, it will continue its terrorist attacks on northern and eastern Syria. This state will use any reactionary and fascist force against the rightful struggles of the people of Syrian and Turkish Kurdistan to achieve their human rights. At the same time, one must not forget that currently the Kurdish issue and the Palestinian issue exist as two serious unresolved issues in the Middle East. Support by parts of the PKK for the fascist Israeli regime—a regime whose intelligence and security organization kidnapped Öcalan and handed him over to the fascist Turkish regime—is, if not stupidity, criminality and praise for fascist executioners.

The Surrender of the YPG (People's Defense Units) to Islamic Fascism in Syria

After the Islamic fascist barbarians and Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist thugs under an Islamic fascist named Ahmed al-Julani, known as Ahmad Sharaa, managed—with a few thousand people in the style of the Taliban and with direct support from Turkey after the retreat and surrender of the Syrian army—to conquer Damascus, the situation initially seemed unbelievable for a large segment of the people, especially the Kurds who control the regions of northern and eastern Syria. The Islamic fascist Ahmad Sharaa, similar to the early Khomeini, initially couldn't believe himself that he had been appointed interim president of a country like Syria. At first, he tried, by emphasizing issues like territorial integrity in the style of fascist monarchist and nationalist Iranian thugs, *arzeshi* [pro-regime hardliners], and Pasdaran [IRGC], to deny the rights of minorities in Syria. But when he realized he couldn't resist a fighting force like the YPG/SDF,

after various blusterings, he was finally forced into dialogue, diplomacy, and signing an agreement with Mazlum Abdi, known as Mazlum Kobani, the commander-in-chief of the SDF forces.

This agreement includes the following 8 articles:

"- Ensuring the right of all Syrian people to participate in the political process. - The Kurdish community is an authentic community of the Syrian state, and the Syrian state guarantees its citizenship and all legal rights. - Ceasefire throughout Syrian territory. - Integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the administration of the Syrian state, including border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields. - Guaranteeing the return of all Syrian refugees to their cities and villages and guaranteeing their protection by the Syrian state. - Supporting the Syrian state in combating the remnants of Assad and all threats against its security and unity. - Rejecting calls for partition, hate speech, and attempts to spread division among all components of Syrian society. - Executive committees are working and striving to implement the agreement by the end of this year at the latest."

This treaty shows that contrary to what Mazlum Abdi announced, it is indeed influenced by the reflection of Öcalan's call and its implementation. This agreement also shows the surrender of the most experienced and skilled forces of Syria [SDF] into a fascist army out of fear of attack by the fascist Turkish regime. It is not without reason that Western NATO member states, their regional allies including Turkey (as the architect of the integration of northern and eastern Syrian forces into the fascist Islamic Syrian regime), the bootlicking thugs of Turkish MIT (namely affiliates of the Barzani tribe), as well as European liberal left parties and currents defend this matter. The truth is that the complete dissolution [lit: melting] of SDF forces into the fascist Syrian army is reminiscent of the surrender and integration of the SA into the SS, or the KDPI's attempt to integrate within the framework of the Islamic Republic. The fascist Ahmad Sharaa, like Khomeini, seeks to buy time to establish an absolutely fascist system. The widespread massacres of hundreds of defenseless Alawites under the guise of fighting remaining groups loyal to the Syrian regime is just a big lie to justify the genocide of Alawites. If Sharaa had the power, he would undoubtedly do the same to the Kurds and others. Not many days had passed since this agreement between Ahmad Sharaa and Mazlum Abdi when the fascist Syrian regime declared a Syrian *Arab* government—a government in which the rights of nationalities [other than Arab] are not mentioned.

Conclusion

The PKK, as a populist bourgeois and nationalist current, like many European populists left parties known as Marxist and communist, merged into the bourgeois, postmodern, and seemingly progressive neoliberal discourse with the end of the bipolar world. Öcalan's theories on democratic confederalism were not a trend towards anarchism, as some defenders of this current suggest, but precisely an integration into imperialist realpolitik, opening its guard against Western imperialism, and accepting the policies of Western states with open arms. Therefore, the PKK sought de-escalation with imperialism, abandoning the anticolonial struggle, abandoning the struggle for "socialism," and beyond that, giving the green light to US imperialism, Israel, and the fascist Turkish regime. Öcalan has repeatedly declared he has the smallest problem with Islam or imperialist states and is ready for cooperation with Turkey, etc. If the leaders of Rojava raise the white flag against Zionist and Islamist fascism and ultimately sign a treaty of integration into the army of a fascist regime, it shows how much these forces are subordinate to imperialist realpolitik and how they conformistically adapt themselves to different conditions. Therefore, illusions that the PKK is an anarchist and left organization are mostly the product of the mental imaginations of those who themselves lack the ability for political organization and always need an imaginary phenomenon for their spiritual gratification. If the "left axis of resistance" achieves spiritual self-gratification [lit: masturbation] with China's long bridges, high-speed trains, and capitalist progress, and Russia's military capability, under the name of defending the Eastern socialist pole, the liberal autonomist, seemingly militant petty-bourgeois left also achieves self-gratification with the PKK and Rojava.

³⁷ https://t.me/enqelabrojava/72882?single

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